INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Frequenza fortemente consigliata

1.     Utility function of self-regarding agents and risk aversion.

2.     Utility function of other-regarding agents and system of incentives

        a.     Demougin, D., Fluet, C., Helm, C. (2006). Output and wages with inequality averse agents. Canadian Journal of Economics, 399-413.

         b.    Grund, C., Sliwka, D. (2005). Envy and compassion in tournaments. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 14(1), 187-207.

         c.    Demougin, D., Fluet, C. (2003). Inequity aversion in tournaments. Working Paper.

         d.    Stark, O., Budzinski, W., Jakubek, M. (2022). Risk aversion when preferences are altruistic. Economics Letters, 216, 110450.

2. Theory of Production – Ch. 5 Mas-Colell.

3. Game Theory and Strategic Entry Deterrence
        a.  Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1984). The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and hungry look. American Economic Review, 74(2), 361-366.

4. Price Discrimination with Preferences vs. Price Discrimination with Naive Consumers
        a. Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., 2006. Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2), 505–540.

        b. Heidhues, P., Koszegi, B., 2017. Naivete-based discrimination. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132 (2), 1019–1054.

        c. Heidhues, P., Kőszegi, B., Murooka, T. (2016). Exploitative innovation. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1), 1-23.

        d.     Zenger, H. (2013). Why firms’ exploitation of consumer myopia may benefit myopic consumers. Economics Letters, 118(2), 307-309.