Progetto SAFI3 a cura della Scuola Superiore di Catania - Ciclo di 4 Master Class in Economic Theory

La Prof.ssa Paola Manzini (University of Bristol, School of Economics) e il Prof. Marco Mariotti (Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance) svolgeranno un ciclo di 4 Master Class in Economic Theory nei giorni 27, 28, 29, 30 aprile.
Questo ciclo di Master Class è stato organizzato nell’ambito del Progetto SAFI3 a cura della Scuola Superiore di Catania.
Le Master Class saranno tutte tenute dalle ore 15 alle ore 18 in Aula B di Palazzo Fortuna. 
La partecipazione dei Colleghi e degli Studenti di Dottorato è gradita. 

Riferimento DEI per questo seminario | DEI reference for this seminar: Prof. Alfio Giarlotta

 

1) Identification from aggregate choices (MM)

2) Choice and Opportunity costs I (PM)

3) Choice and Opportunity costs II (PM)

4) Dynamic choice and taste for variety (MM)

1) We study identification in models of aggregate choice generated by unobserved behavioral types. An analyst observes only aggregate choice behavior, while the population distribution of types and their type-level choice patterns are latent. Assuming only minimal and purely qualitative prior knowledge of the process generating type-level choice probabilities, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for identifiability. Identification obtains if and only if the data exhibit sufficient cross-type behavioral heterogeneity, which we characterize  quivalently through combinatorial matching conditions between types and alternatives, through algebraic properties of the matrices mapping type-level to aggregate choice behavior and through a behavioral characterization.

2)    We define the (physical) opportunity cost of a choice x as the alternative that would be chosen if x were not available, and the opportunity cost of any unchosen alternative as x itself. The agent has preferences over pairs consisting of alternatives and their opportunity costs. Because costs affect choice and vice-versa, choice results from an intrapersonal equilibrium rather than from simple maximisation. In spite of significant rationality assumptions, the resulting behaviour can be highly non-standard, allowing intransitive choices. Rational utility maximisation is ensured by an additional new consistency condition on preferences. However, we argue that the maximised utility cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as a welfare relevant “revealed preference”. A generalisation of our model accommodates additional departures from standard rationality in the form of menu effects.

3)    We study choice when alternatives are evaluated relative to endogenous opportunity costs. We propose the Self-Confirming Opportunity Model (SCOM), an intrapersonal equilibrium concept. In a SCOM each alternative is paired with the option chosen from the remaining menu as its opportunity cost, and choice maximises a menu-independent quaternary preference over such pairs. We provide a revealed-preference characterisation of this model. SCOM accommodates cyclical choice, Condorcet inconsistencies and choice overload patterns within a disciplined maximisation framework. Standard rational choice obtains if and only if the underlying quaternary preference satisfies a coherence condition, yielding a strict order over alternatives. 

4)    We model an agent who holds a stable intrinsic preference over alternatives but also experiences repetition aversion—a dislike for choosing the same object again “too soon”, which leads the agent to temporarily exclude it from consideration. A long sequence of the agent’s choices is observed. Repetition aversion disrupts the usual connection between preference and choice: even when x is both strictly preferred to y and less repetition aversive, it may not be chosen more frequently than y . We provide a complete characterisation of repetition-averse choice sequences and establish how intrinsic preference can be disentangled from repetition aversion.

________________________________________
Categoria: 
Seminari
Data di Pubblicazione: 
Martedì, 21 Aprile, 2026