MARKETING ECONOMICS AND REGULATION

Academic Year 2023/2024 - Teacher: MARCO FERDINANDO MARTORANA

Expected Learning Outcomes

The course aims at studying the economic and legal aspects of the activity of regulation and protection of competition in those sectors that, for their peculiarities, require to be highly regulated, mainly because of the existence of information asymmetries and/or externalities. ​In-class discussions of case studies concerning the regulatory policies for public utilities and the analysis of the Antitrrust activity, in Italy and abroad, will allow students to develop their critical and autonomous opinions on the isuue and to apply practically the theoretical framework acquired during the course. At the end of the course the student will have to demonstrate the awareness of the main applied models of Industrial Economics and of those tools of the economic analysis that are required to evaluate critically the problems of economic regulation and the policies for the protection of competition.

Course Structure

The course includes lectures, carried out with the support of slides and supplementary teaching material that is made available to students through the Studium platform. There will also be moments of classroom discussion on case studies. 

Required Prerequisites

None. A basic knowledge of Microeconomics and Public Economics is recommended

Attendance of Lessons

Not mandatory but strongly suggested

Detailed Course Content

Economic regulation and its alternatives. The notion of natural monopoly. The concepts of competition for the market and in the market. The regulation of natural monopoly in presence of information asymmetries. Network services: peculiarities, access problems and forms of regulations. The regulation of public utilities. The US, European and Italian Antitrust laws. The relevant market: definition and delimitation. Cartels and collusions: forms, causes, standards of proof and enforcement activity. Mergers and acquisitions: forms, economic effects and assessment by the European Commission. Abuse of dominant position: predatory pricing, economic theories and imputation tests.

Textbook Information

1) Cervigni G. e D’Antoni M., Monopolio naturale, concorrenza e regolamentazione, Carocci, 2001: chapters I (with the exception of subparagraphs 1.3.2 and 1.3.4); II (with the exception of paragraph 2.3 and subparagraphs 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.5.3 and appendix); III (up to p. 163); V (only paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).

2) Marzi G., Prosperetti L. e Putzu E., La regolazione dei servizi infrastrutturali, il Mulino, 2001: chapter VI. The book is out of order, at the moment. However, a copy of it is available by the professor.

3) Motta M. e Polo M., Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza, Il Mulino, 2005. chapters: I, III (with the exception of paragraph 3.2), IV (with the exception of paragraphs 3.4, 3.5 and 5), V (with the exception of paragraph 2.4), VII (only paragraphs 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 (with the exception pof subparagraph 2.3.2), 2.4, 2.5, 3.1 and 3.2), VIII (only paragraph 2).

4) Motta M., On cartel deterrence and fines in the European Union, European Competition Law Review 2008, v. 29, n. 4, pp. 209-220

5) Pedilla A.J., “Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers: Williamson Revisited”, In: Issues in Competition Law and Policy, Wayne Dale Collins, ed., American Bar Association Press, 2005 August 2005, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=812989

6) Motta M., The European Commission’s guidance communication on article 82, European Competition Law Review 2009, v. 30, n. 12, p. 593-599 or, alternatively, Kellerbauer M., The Commission’s new enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC to dominant companies’ exclusionary conduct : a shift towards a more economic approach?, European Competition Law Review 2010, v. 31, n. 5, pp. 175-186

Other useful readings:

- Buccirossi, Paolo. (2008) Handbook of antitrust economics. The MIT Press.

- Church, Jeffrey R., and Roger Ware. (2000) Industrial organization: a strategic approach. Homewood, IL.: Irwin McGraw Hill.

- Cretì, A., & Fontini, F. (2019). Economics of Electricity: Markets, Competition and Rules. Cambridge University Press.

- Davis, P., & Garcés, E. (2009). Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis. Princeton University Press.

- Viscusi, W. Kip, Joseph E. Harrington Jr, and David EM Sappington. (2018) Economics of regulation and antitrust. MIT press, 2018.

 

Course Planning

 SubjectsText References
1An introduction to RegulationBook 1: chapter I. 
2Natural monopolyBook 1: chapter I. 
3theory of contestable markets and Demsetz types of competitionBook 1: chapter I. 
4optimal tariffs under perfect informationBook 1: chapter II. 
5optimal tariffs: linear tariffsBook 1: chapter II. 
6optimal tariffs: non-linear tariffsBook 1: chapter II. 
7optimal tariffs under asymmetric informationBook 1: chapter III. 
8Rate of Return regulation and price-capBook 1: chapter V. 
9Network services: access Book 2: chapter VI. 
10Interconnection pricing regulationBook 2: chapter  VI. 
11ECPR regulationBool 1: chapter IV (par. 4.2.1) Book 2: chapter VI
12Regulation in the market for electricityBook 1 chapter VI
13Regulation in the market for natural gashandouts
14Regulation in the telecommunications marketshandouts
15An historical overview of antitrust policies in the USA and in the EUBook 3: chapter I. 
16The definition of the relevant market: the SSNIP testBook 3: chapter III. 
17Market power: the HHI and the Lerner indexBook 3: chapter III. 
18Collusion and CartelsBook £: chapter IV. 
19factors influencing collusionBook 3: chapter IV. 
20Standards of proof and enforcement activitiesBook 3: chapter IV. 
21The EU regulation framework regarding cartelsBook 4 
22Horizontal merger: effectsBook 3: chapter V. 
23the Williamson's modelBook 5 
24Horizontal mergers: structural remediesBook 3: chapter V. 
25The EU regulation framework regarding horizontal mergersBook 3: chapter  V. 
26Predatory pricingBook 3: chapter VII. 
27predatory pricing under asymmetric informationBook 3: chapter VII 
28The EU regulation framework regarding predatory pricingBook 3: chapter VII. 
29The dominant position in the EU regulation frameworkBook 6 
30Price squeeze Book 3: chapter VII. 
31Monopolization and exclusionary practises Book 3: chapter VII and VIII (p.318-322). 

Learning Assessment

Learning Assessment Procedures

the examination is based on a written exam that includes open-ended questions, and simple mathematical and graphical problems. the evaluation criteria are: 1) knowledge, 2) use of the appropriate technical language, 3) Reasoning ability

Examples of frequently asked questions and / or exercises

Examples of questions and problems, as well as an exmination sample would be provided on Studium.


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